Self-regulation involves the private provision of public goods and private redistribution and takes place outside the institutions of government and, hence, in the realm of private rather than public politics.
distance between them. The second occurs in a heterogeneous society where citizens with weaker moral preferences free ride on the self-regulation of citizens with stronger moral preferences. To mitigate the free-rider problems and expand the scope of self-regulation, individuals and firms have created organizations. Examples include social label organizations that identify products meeting certain environmental standards and organizations that certify working conditions in the factories of suppliers. For example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) formed by NGOs and firms in the apparel and footwear industries provides for inspections of working conditions in factories and makes public the results. 4 Organizations can be evaluated in terms of how they mitigate the incentives to free ride and the extent to which they expand the scope of self-regulation. The organizations considered provide assurance and information. Assurance organizations have enforcement capabilities and can penalize participants who break their pledges not to free ride. Since participation in the organization is voluntary, enforcement is self-imposed. Assurance organizations expand the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism by mitigating the first free-rider problem. Enforcement can be provided by both nonprofit and for-profit organizations, but their policies are different. For-profit enforcement is more aggressive than nonprofit enforcement, and the price charged is higher than the fee required for nonprofit enforcement. Assurance organizations attract participants with intermediate moral preferences as identified by the socioeconomic distance from their partners. Enforcement can also be externally imposed through social pressure by, for example, NGOs that are funded by voluntary donations by citizens. Enforcement through social pressure also expands the scope of self-regulation by mitigating the first free-rider problem, and the donations by citizens are collectively optimal because of their moral preferences.
Informational organizations have no enforcement capability but instead provide social labels that sort citizens according to their moral preferences or certify their conduct. Social label organizations attract as members those individuals with stronger moral preferences, and certification organizations attract individuals with both stronger and weaker moral preferences. Neither organization can exist with unconditional altruism, but in a society with heterogeneous and limited moral preferences, informational organizations expand the scope of self-regulation. Social label organizations allow those individuals with stronger moral preferences to interact among themselves to avoid the free riding by individuals with weaker moral preferences. A certification organization induces some individuals with weaker moral preferences to pool with individuals with stronger moral preferences and induces some individuals with stronger moral preferences to separate from those with weaker moral preferences. Informational organizations, however, mitigate only the second free-rider problem and cannot expand the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism. Assurance organizations thus are more effective in expanding the scope of self-regulation than are informational organizations.
To characterize the scope of morally motivated self-regulation, the random matching framework developed by Avanash Dixit (2003b) (2004) is used. The model is related to that of Guido Tabellini (2008) , who considers a version of Dixit's model in which people are in a prisoner's dilemma and experience guilt if they do not cooperate. Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin (2007) consider a religious organization that arises endogenously when people have heterogeneous beliefs about being punished if they defect in a prisoner's dilemma game.
The next section introduces the basic model with moral preferences and characterizes the equilibrium in the absence of organizations. Section II considers assurance organizations where enforcement is self-imposed, and Section III considers externally imposed enforcement through BARON: MORALLy MOTIVATEd SELf-REGuLATION social pressure. Section IV considers informational organizations without enforcement capabilities that rely on social labeling and certification. Conclusions are offered in the final section.
I. The Basic Model

A. Matching and Self-Regulation
The agents in the model can include individuals and firms, both of which will be referred to as citizens. Citizens are randomly matched and have the opportunity to make a contractable trade associated with which is a social dilemma in which each citizen has an opportunity to self-regulate. Self-regulation is the noncontractable voluntary provision of a public good or private redistribution of wealth. For individuals, self-regulation may involve the mitigation of an environmental externality, a contribution to a community project, or the purchase of products produced in factories with good working conditions. Private redistribution could benefit some unmodeled recipient, such as microfinance borrowers, disaster victims, or children in developing countries. Firms can also self-regulate. A firm could provide unobservable credence attributes of its product that consumers cannot learn through search, experience, or consumption. Such attributes could include the conditions under which a product is produced, including any environmental externalities associated with production, how well workers are treated and paid, and whether it is made from sustainable inputs.
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Following Dixit citizens are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a circle with circumference 2L. 6 The parameter L may be thought of as how disparate is the society, so the more factionalized the society the larger is L. Each citizen is randomly matched with another citizen at a socioeconomic distance y with probability density κ( y) = α e − αy /2(1 − e − αL ), α > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the set-up with citizens A and B matched at a distance y. The distance y could be geographic and hence distinguish between neighbors and strangers, or it could be socioeconomic where citizens are differentiated by genetics, culture, language, class, and the like.
The higher is α the greater is the probability that a match is local, so a higher α can be interpreted as reflecting how close-knit is a society. The matching may be thought of as representing the everyday activities of citizens, and it is more likely that those activities involve citizens who are close to rather than far from each other on a socioeconomic dimension. Alternatively, if the matches are determined by some (unmodeled) search activities, it is more likely that citizens find more desirable matches closer rather than farther from their location.
B. Payoffs and Preferences
The matched citizens interact, and associated with the interaction is an opportunity for each to provide a local public good or redistribute his wealth, both of which will be referred to as contributing. Contributing is assumed to have a cost c > 0 and may provide benefits b ≥ 0 to the contributor 5 These actions could be due to the preferences of shareholders, as in Joshua Graff Zivin and Arthur Small (2005) and Baron (2007) (2009) . Morally based preferences could also reflect the preferences of the managers of the firm when there is separation of ownership from control, as considered in Baron (2008) .
6 Glenn Ellison (1993) and Ilan Eshel, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked (1998) consider complete information, repeated games with random matching in which players are distributed on a circle and can provide local public goods that benefit only immediate neighbors. Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked allow players to choose to be an altruist or an egoist based on comparing with their neighbors the average payoffs to each type. They characterize the limiting distribution of types and conclude that players are primarily altruists. Ellison shows that although in the limit players play the risk dominant equilibrium the rate of convergence can be sensitive to the matching model. Convergence is rapid when players are matched only with their neighbors. 7 Dixit provides an interpretation of this formulation as resulting from search activities.
or to the citizen with whom she is matched. 8 The benefit could be from a reduction in pollution emitted, a firm adopting best practices in disposing of toxic waste, or a neighborhood clean-up project. The citizens are assumed to gain from free riding; i.e., c > b, and the aggregate benefits 2b need not be greater than the cost. To simplify the analysis and maintain the symmetry of the matching model, the costs and benefits are assumed to be the same for both citizens. Heterogeneity is incorporated in Section IV by letting the strength of moral preferences differ among citizens.
A citizen is assumed to have preferences over the costs and benefits and may also have otherregarding, altruistic preferences pertaining to the effect of her actions on the well-being of her matched partner or others affected by the contribution. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002) conclude from experiments that most subjects exhibited altruism, and those who did behaved in accord with revealed preference theory. Hence, their preferences can be represented by a utility function.
Altruism can be generalized or limited. Generalized altruism is independent of the characteristics, e.g., the socioeconomic distance, of one's matched partner, whereas limited altruism depends on the socioeconomic distance. Altruistic preferences may be stronger the closer the trading partner is to the citizen, since she may care more about those who are closer to her, e.g., care more about neighbors or kin than strangers (Edward C. Banfield 1958) . Altruistic preferences also may be independent of the action of the matched partner or reciprocal.
9 For example, a citizen may abandon her altruistic preferences if her partner is not expected to reciprocate in self-regulating. Alternatively, altruism could be unconditional and hence independent of the partner's action. 8 The model can be extended to public goods that benefit all citizens, as considered in Appendix B. 9 In a dictator game experiment Iris Bohert and Bruno S. Frey (1999) found that dictators' offers to other players were decreasing in the social distance between the players, where social distance corresponded to identifiability and familiarity. Similarly, in a voluntary public goods experiment Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden (2000) found that contributions were greater and free riding less among those who interacted repeatedly than among those who were strangers. Elianna La Ferrara (2003) provided an overlapping generations model of credit in a "kin group" and found support for the model from data from Ghana. Credit terms were better (e.g., no interest) and default rates were lower for intrakin loans and for households that had contributed funds for lending in the past. These results are consistent with the importance of socioeconomic distance and also with the importance of reciprocity. , where θ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] is the degree of reciprocity with unconditional altruism represented by (θ = 1), η represents the degree of limited morality with η = 0 corresponding to generalized altruism and η → ∞ corresponding to no altruism, and the parameter x > 0 reflects the benefits to others. Reciprocal altruism corresponds to θ < 1, where θ = 0 represents pure reciprocal altruism where the citizen cares about her match partner only if the partner contributes, and θ ∈ (0, 1) represents impure reciprocal altruism.
10 The parameter x could equal the benefits b provided to the matched partner in the case of a local public good. If c represents private redistribution, then x ≥ c − b corresponds to a contribution benefiting the recipient by at least as much as the net cost to the contributor. For example, the recipient could be a third party who receives benefits x from the contribution c of a citizen. Then, the benefit for the citizen is b = 0, and each's motivation is solely from altruism. Moral preferences thus can be generalized or limited, can be unconditional or reciprocal, and can pertain to the partner or to others as illustrated in Figure 2 .
The basic self-regulation game is presented in Figure 3 . The timing in the game is that nature first draws a match for each citizen, and then the matched pairs simultaneously choose their actions. A strategy S is a mapping from the match distance to the action set {C, N }, where C denotes contributing and N denotes not contributing. Reciprocity pertains to actions, so a citizen must have beliefs about whether her trading partner will contribute, so let δ = δ( y) denote the probability that the partner at a match distance y plays C.
11 If a citizen contributes, her expected utility E u C is
Reciprocal altruism could be represented in other ways. David K. Levine (1998) represents it through preferences in which a citizen is "more altruistic to an opponent who is more altruistic toward them." Rabin (1993 Rabin ( , 1282 considers a concept of fairness in which "people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being kind." He represents this by a "kindness function" that depends on strategies and beliefs. Here, reciprocal altruism is conditional only on the (anticipated) action of the match partner. 11 Tabellini considers reciprocity similar to that considered here, but his basic model assumes strategic complements, so the qualitative properties of his equilibria are unchanged by reciprocity. His formulation of reciprocity corresponds to shame as considered in Section III and results in a larger scope of self-regulation. Reciprocity here results in a strictly smaller scope of self-regulation compared to unconditional altruism when citizens' moral preferences are heterogeneous. and if the citizen does not contribute, her expected utility E u N is
With unconditional altruism the game exhibits strategically neutrality and has a dominant strategy equilibrium. With reciprocal altruism the self-regulation game has strategic complements and is a coordination game. Initially, information is assumed to be complete. The equilibrium concept is Nash, only symmetric equilibria are considered, and when there are multiple equilibria the focus is on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. The game is played only once, so citizens have no opportunity to develop a reputation. So that a citizen with limited, unconditional morality does not prefer to contribute for all matches, assume that b − c + x e − η L < 0. Similarly, assume that b − c + x > 0, so a citizen prefers to contribute when matched with a citizen at her own location.
The model is formulated as symmetric to simplify the analysis and expose the intuition underlying the equilibria. The symmetric model can be viewed as a special case of a more general asymmetric self-regulation model, where the asymmetry results in differences among citizens in the boundaries of their self-regulation. Such differences are considered in Section IV in terms of heterogeneity in the parameter η of limited altruism.
C. Self-Regulation Equilibria
To characterize the equilibria, note that the difference in a citizen's expected utilities from playing C rather than N is
Then, defining the boundary or scope y o (δ, θ) of self-regulation by indifference in (3) yields With unconditional (θ = 1) altruism, a citizen has a dominant strategy S * of contributing if (3) is nonnegative and choosing N otherwise; that is,
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where y o ≡ y o (δ, 1). For a match at the boundary y o the expected utility in (1) from contributing is E u C = b, which is the benefit received from the contribution of the partner. For matches closer than y o limited morality is sufficient to overcome the incentive to free ride, and both citizens contribute. For more distant matches the incentive to free ride prevails, and citizens do not contribute.
With reciprocal altruism (θ < 1) the boundary of self-regulation depends on expectations about the partner's action. If the partner is expected to play N (δ = 0), the unique equilibrium for matches y ∈ [ 0, y o (0; θ)] is for a citizen to play C, since she has a dominant strategy. Similarly, for y > y o (1; θ) the dominant strategy equilibrium is (N, N ), since even if the partner were to play C, a citizen cannot gain from contributing.
For matches with y ∈ ( y o (0; θ), y o (1; θ)], the game has three best-response equilibria. In the Pareto dominant equilibrium both citizens play C, and neither has an incentive to deviate. The equilibrium strategy thus is the same as with unconditional altruism in (5). In a second equilibrium both citizens play N, since if the partner will play N, by playing C a citizen can gain only
The third equilibrium is in mixed strategies. 13 To provide the toughest test for an organization to expand the set of matches in which citizens contribute, the focus is on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. The boundary thus will be denoted y o = y o (1, θ).
14 12 Tabellini (2008) considers a model in which a citizen experiences guilt if she chooses N but less guilt the more distant is the other citizen in the match. Let the disutility from guilt be additive and represented by g e − γ y and assume that g and γ are common knowledge. Then, the boundary y o (δ, 1; g, γ) of contributions satisfies
+ g e . The boundary is strictly decreasing in γ. Guilt has an effect similar to that of unconditional altruism in the sense that the scope of self-regulation increases with stronger (lower η) moral preferences. 13 In the mixed strategy equilibrium both citizens play C with probability δ( y) given by
That is, given that the partner plays δ( y), a citizen is indifferent between playing C or N and hence is willing to play δ( y). The probability δ( y) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in y, i.e., because of limited morality a higher probability of a partner contributing is required to support contributions for more distant matches. For matches y > y o (1, θ) even a partner contributing with probability 1 is insufficient to induce the citizen to contribute. Note that δ( y o (0, θ)) = 0 and δ( y o (1; θ)) = 1. If y o (0; θ) = 0, the minimum probability δ o of contributing even for a match y = 0 is
The probability δ( y) of playing C is strictly increasing in θ, since
Consequently, the scope of self-regulation is increasing in the extent to which morality is unconditional rather than reciprocal. In the limit as θ → 1 contributions from all citizens are induced for matches y ∈ [0, y o (1; θ)], as characterized for the case of unconditional altruism.
14 The mixed strategy equilibrium and the (N, N ) equilibrium identify a role for culture to the extent that it can foster unconditional altruism (as well as generalized morality) or it selects an equilibrium with a greater scope of self-regulation. Culture changes slowly, however, and citizens have the alternative of forming organizations to increase the scope of self-regulation, as considered in Sections II-IV.
The comparative statics with unconditional altruism and reciprocal altruism are straightforward. The stronger are moral preferences (lower η), the larger is the set of matches for which citizens contribute. Also, lim η → ∞ y o = 0, so in the limit as moral preferences become weaker the scope of self-regulation goes to 0. Altruism is thus necessary for self-regulation. The boundary y o is strictly convex in η, so more limited morality results in relatively smaller decreases in the scope of self-regulation. Also, the greater is the parameter x the greater is the scope of self-regulation. The limit as x decreases to c − b is zero contributions; i.e., li m x → c − b y o = 0. The boundary y o is strictly increasing in b and strictly decreasing in c. Consequently, the more beneficial relative to its cost, or higher quality, is self-regulation, the greater is the scope of selfregulation. Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium and the comparative statics with respect to the quality (b − c) of self-regulation and the strength of moral preferences.
The ex ante expected utility E u * of a citizen is
The first term is the expected utility from the benefits and costs of contributing, and the second term is the expected utility from altruism. The expected utility is increasing in α, since more matches are local, and decreasing in the dispersion L of society, since contributions are made for a smaller proportion of matches. The expected utility is increasing in the quality (higher b, lower c) of self-regulation and the strength (lower η, higher x) of moral preferences. The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition. 
II. Assurance Organizations
The self-regulation in the previous section is unorganized, but citizens could form voluntary organizations to increase the scope of their self-regulation. One type of organization provides enforcement that raises the cost of not contributing, as in the case of the FLA. Alternatively, enforcement could result from social pressure applied by NGOs that monitor working conditions and report whether a living wage is paid. This section considers self-imposed enforcement provided by self-supporting nonprofit organizations and by for-profit firms and compares their enforcement policies and scopes of self-regulation. The analysis does not explain the process by which an organization is formed but instead identifies incentives and explains whether citizens would avail themselves of the services of the organization.
A. Nonprofit Self-Imposed Enforcement
Citizens may have incentives to join a nonprofit organization with an enforcement capability that raises the cost of not contributing. Membership in the organization is assumed to be voluntary, so citizens subject themselves to enforcement; i.e., enforcement is self-imposed. Citizens self-impose enforcement because it disciplines them to contribute for a larger set of matches. The membership decision is assumed to be made by citizens after the match has been drawn but before the play of the self-regulation game.
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Enforcement is assumed to take the form of punishment or harm h imposed if a citizen violates her pledge to contribute. 16 The harm could be damage to a brand or a reputation resulting from public exposure as in the case of the firms participating in the FLA. Enforcement is assumed to be available everywhere on the circle, and the strength of enforcement is taken to be h. 17 To make the threat of harm credible, the organization must develop the capability of (i) determining whether a citizen contributed and (ii) delivering harm. Developing the capability is assumed to have a cost f (h) per citizen and is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly convex in h. The nonprofit organization is self-supporting by charging a fee f (h) to each citizen who demands enforcement.
Citizens with matches y ∈ [ 0, y o ] have a best response of contributing, so the only citizens with a demand for enforcement are those with more distant matches. A citizen who self-imposes enforcement will contribute if
so an enforcement organization has members only when f (h) < h ; i.e, only when it can mitigate the (first) free-rider problem. Citizens with matches y ∈ [ y o , y * ] benefit from enforcement when f (h) < h, where
The ex post membership decision may be thought of as an ex ante membership decision (with small dues) and a usage fee incurred when a citizen avails herself of the services of the organization. The usage fee covers the cost of providing enforcement, where that cost is incurred ex post depending on the extent to which members use the enforcement services. 16 In this sense enforcement is analogous to a contract with a penalty for breach. The situations in which self-regulation occurs, however, are generally those in which a contract would be costly to enforce in a court. Moreover, the participants in an organization such as the FLA would likely be reluctant to turn jurisdiction over to a court. 17 In a repeated game with random matching, Michihiro Kandori (1992) showed that cooperation is sustained if there THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
The organization expands the scope of self-regulation ( y * > y o ) when h > f (h), and y * is decreasing in f (h), so the scope of self-regulation is limited by the cost of enforcement. Participation is individually rational for citizens with matches y > y
That is, the fee must be less than the benefits from the partner's contribution.
The membership in the organization is thus citizens with moderate matches y ∈ ( y o , y * ], i.e., citizens who interact with others at a sufficient socioeconomic distance that their incentive to free ride can be overcome through self-enforcement. For citizens with distant interactions ( y > y * ) the incentive to free ride is too strong to be overcome by the self-supporting, nonprofit enforcement organization.
The nonprofit organization can choose the strength h of its enforcement, and it is assumed to maximize the aggregate utility of those using its enforcement services. That is, the organization operates in the interest of its members. The aggregate utility E u n of the members is
The optimal strength h * of enforcement satisfies the first-order condition, for y * < L,
The second-order condition is assumed to be satisfied at h * , a sufficient condition for which is α ≥ η. The second term in (10) is the marginal cost of enforcement, and the first term is the marginal gain from enforcement. The marginal effect of enforcement on the scope of self-regulation is proportional to 1 − f ′ ( h * ), and b − h * is the incentive to free-ride for the citizen in the most distant match y = y * for which enforcement is demanded.
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The following proposition summarizes the optimal enforcement by the nonprofit organization when y * < L and is proved in Appendix A in conjunction with the proof of Proposition 3 in Section IIC.
PROPOSITION 2: When y * < L, the optimal strength h * of enforcement for a nonprofit organization has the following properties:
o , and the increased scope y * − y o is constant in x and θ; (vi) α ≥ η is a sufficient condition for h * to be increasing in c.
Enforcement extends to the point at which its marginal cost is less than its marginal effect on self-regulation; i.e., f ′ ( h * ) < 1, and nonprofit enforcement expands the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism since h * > f ( h * ). The optimal strength of enforcement is independent of θ, since contributions occur for all matches y ∈ [ 0, y * ]. Enforcement is independent of x, since that parameter affects y o and y * in the same proportion. The individual rationality condition is satisfied since b > h * > f ( h * ), so all citizens with matches y ∈ ( y o , y * ] demand is enough local punishment. See also Ellison (1994) . Here punishment is administered by the organization, and enforcement is self-imposed. 18 If the cost of enforcement is sufficiently low, the optimal enforcement could result in contributions by all citizens ( y * = L). The nonprofit organization then chooses the strength h * of enforcement to minimize f (h) and satisfies
enforcement. Sufficient but not necessary conditions for the demand y * − y o for enforcement to be increasing in the quality (b − c) of self-regulation and the strength η of moral preferences is that h * is increasing in b and decreasing in η. The effect of b and η on the optimal strength of enforcement, however, is ambiguous in sign.
B. for-Profit Self-Imposed Enforcement
Citizens could rely on the for-profit sector rather than nonprofit organizations for enforcement. For-profit enforcement is common in providing security, and organizations such as the FLA require that independent organizations, some of which are for-profit, conduct the inspections of overseas factories. This section explores whether enforcement of the form in the preceding section will be supplied in the marketplace by a single profit-maximizing firm and how its enforcement compares with that by a nonprofit organization. Self-imposed enforcement is again considered.
The firm cannot observe the match distance and hence cannot discriminate among those who demand its enforcement, but it can observe whether the citizens contribute. The firm chooses the strength h of enforcement and the price p for its services. Enforcement is demanded by citizens with matches y ∈ ( y o ,  y ], where  y is defined as in (8) with p replacing f (h). Individual rationality for citizens requires p < b, and  y > y o if h > p. The conditions p < b and h > p are ignored in the following analysis and in Proposition 3 are shown to be satisfied in the optimal enforcement policy.
Since the firm incurs the cost f (h) of enforcement only for those citizens who demand enforcement, its profit Π is given by
which is assumed to be strictly concave in p and h. In contrast to nonprofit enforcement, the firm does not take into account the citizens' utility from altruism other than through its effect on demand. The optimal price is characterized first, and then the optimal enforcement is characterized. The first-order condition for the optimal price  p (h) given h is
A sufficient but not necessary condition for the second-order condition to be satisfied is α ≥ η. The condition in (12) implies that  p (h) > f (h), so the price charged is greater than the cost of enforcement. A sufficient condition for the price to be strictly increasing in h is α ≥ η. Using the envelope theorem, the profit-maximizing enforcement  h satisfies the first-order condition
The properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the following proposition and related to those with nonprofit enforcement. The proof is presented in Appendix A. PROPOSITION 3: (A) The optimal enforcement policy of a profit-maximizing firm satisfies:
and  h are independent of x and θ.
(B) The enforcement policies of the nonprofit organization and the profit-maximizing firm have the following relations:
At the optimal for-profit enforcement  h , the marginal price equals the marginal cost, since p and h are perfect substitutes in the boundary  y of enforcement; i.e., only the difference between  p =  p (  h ) and  h affects demand. An increase in the quality of self-regulation increases the scope of self-regulation.
Enforcement by a for-profit firm is more aggressive (  h > h * ) than enforcement by a nonprofit organization. This results because the firm has a first-order incentive to increase its price, which reduces demand. Demand can be increased, however, by stronger enforcement, which is carried to the point at which the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue product of enforcement.
, the firm is profitable, and there is an incentive to form a firm that provides enforcement.
C. Comparison
Both for-profit and nonprofit enforcement increase the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unorganized self-regulation, and this section compares the two forms of enforcement organizations. 19 A nonprofit enforcement organization yields greater aggregate utility for citizens than forprofit enforcement when it expands the scope of self-regulation at least as much as does the firm.
PROPOSITION 4: If y * ≥  y , a nonprofit enforcement organization yields greater aggregate utility than does a for-profit enforcement organization.
PROOF:
The expected utility of citizens is given in (9) for a nonprofit enforcement organization, and for a for-profit enforcement organization the expected utility E u π of citizens is given by the same expression, with  p replacing f ( h * ) and  y replacing y * . If y * ≥  y , the utility difference is
From Proposition 3 (B)(i) the first integrand is positive, since enforcement is more aggressive by the firm than by the nonprofit organization. The integrand in the second integral is nonnegative for y ∈ [  y , y * ] from the individual rationality condition in (7) and the definition of y * .
19 To expand self-regulation, citizens could demand public regulation to compel themselves to self-regulate. For example, the government could require citizens to purchase a carbon offset when flying or firms to pay a living wage in overseas factories. Regulation and its enforcement, however, is costly, and the cost could exceed the benefits. Appendix C presents a model of public regulation and compares it to enforcement by nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
y > y * , and the utility difference,
is ambiguous in sign. As above the first integrand is positive, and the second integrand is positive for y ∈ [ y * ,  y ) from the individual rationality condition and the definition of  y ; i.e.,
where the second inequality follows by Proposition 3(A)(iii). For-profit enforcement expands self-regulation beyond that with nonprofit enforcement when  h −  p > h * − f ( h * ), which benefits additional citizens, but aggregate utility for matches y ∈ ( y o , y * ) is lower because of the higher cost of enforcement.
Citizens can use both nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and citizens prefer the enforcement services of the nonprofit organization for matches y ∈ ( , the expression in (12) is negative when evaluated at  p , so strict concavity of Π implies that  p π <  p . The firm charges a lower price when coexisting with a nonprofit organization. This analysis is summarized in the following proposition. 
III. Externally Imposed Enforcement through Social Pressure
An alternative to organized, self-imposed enforcement as a means of mitigating the free-rider problem is reliance on externally imposed enforcement through social pressure. For example, environmental NGOs pressure firms to reduce the harmful environmental impacts of their activities. Other NGOs pressure firms to improve the working conditions in overseas factories and to pay a living wage. The FLA was formed under social pressure. The basic enforcement instrument of activist NGOs is "naming and shaming." That is, identifying a citizen who has failed to contribute and informing others of that failure, resulting in shame. This social pressure typically is funded by voluntary donations by citizens, and those donations face their own collective action problem. Nevertheless, many NGOs are well funded by membership dues and donations, which are encouraged by tax deductibility.
This section introduces an activist NGO funded by voluntary donations by citizens. Those donations support the naming and shaming of citizens who fail to self-regulate in their matches. Naming and shaming mitigates the free-rider problem in a manner analogous to that in the previous section by imposing harm in the form of shame. 20 In contrast to self-imposed enforcement all citizens are potentially subject to naming and shaming by the activist. Since the capacity of NGOs to monitor self-regulation is limited, monitoring and enforcement are assumed to be probabilistic and a function of the donations received from citizens. Each citizen can donate an amount a, and the total donations A received are used to detect the play in a match with probability q = Q(A), where Q(A) is strictly increasing and concave with Q(0) = 0. When play is detected, the activist can impose harm h on a citizen who played N, where h is assumed to be exogenous, and hence not chosen by the activist, but could depend on the actions of other citizens. For example, a firm may not incur as much harm if it is revealed to have played N when all other firms also played N as when the other firms played C. In the latter case the harm results from the public shame of having been disclosed as having played N when others played C.
The donations to the activist are made ex ante before the self-regulation game takes place. With reciprocal altruism and the threat of incurring shame, a citizen self-regulates if
If qh > c − b, the social pressure is sufficiently great that citizens contribute for all matches. The focus here is on the case in which social pressure is not that strong. The equilibrium strategy of a citizen then is to contribute if and only if y ≤ y q , where
The boundary y q is strictly increasing and strictly convex in q, and for q = 0, y q = y 0 . Consequently, greater donations to the activist expand the scope of self-regulation beyond the scope with unorganized self-regulation.
As discussed in Section I a citizen's altruism pertains to the increase in the utility of others caused by her actions. Her donation induces self-regulation by citizens for a larger set of matches and results in a gain of 4b − 2c + 2x e − η y in such a match. This gain is provided for matches y ∈ ( y q′ , y q ], where q′ is the detection probability without her donation and q is the probability with her donation. As an approximation view each citizen as an atom, and assume that there are 2M citizens. Thus, q′ = Q( ∑ j≠i a j ) and q = Q( ∑ j a j ), where a j is the donation of citizen j. The expected utility E u j A of a citizen j is then
20 The harm to the citizen could vary depending on the nature of the self-regulation problem. For example, an environmental issue could result in more harm than a working conditions issue in overseas factories. Marc J. Epstein and Katherine Schnietz (2002) found that the protests at the failed 1999 Seattle WTO meeting resulted in a statistically significant decrease in the market values of firms targeted as environmentally abusive but had no significant effect on the market values of firms targeted as having abusive labor conditions in overseas factories. Donations thus are motivated in (15) by the gains to citizens in the additional matches in which they contribute in the self-regulation game.
The optimal donation a j by a citizen satisfies the first-order condition, which in a symmetric equilibrium is
where A * = ∑ j a j * is the equilibrium aggregate donations. A sufficient condition for the secondorder condition to be satisfied is α > η. 22 The effect of the donation on the scope of self-regulation is valued at the marginal incentive (b − Q( A * )h) to free ride multiplied by the marginal probability α e − α y q /(1 − e − αL ) of a match in the expanded set of matches on which self-regulation takes place. Since each citizen takes the utility of all citizens into account at the margin, the social pressure is collectively optimal.
The results of this section are summarized as: The effect of the quality (b − c) of self-regulation on the donation a * cannot be identified unambiguously. If a * is nondecreasing in b, however, y q − y o is increasing in the quality of selfregulation. The same is true if a * is decreasing in b but not strongly. 24 The donation a * is lower the stronger (higher x) are altruistic preferences, since more citizens self-regulate in the absence of social pressure. The donation is also lower the more disparate is society, since matches are more distant.
IV. Informational Organizations
Not all organizations are formed with an enforcement capability. Some organizations simply allow citizens to interact with others with similar preferences. These organizations will be referred to as social label organizations. Other organizations provide information about the conduct of a matched partner. One form of this is certification, where the organization credibly certifies that a citizen has conducted herself in accord with expectations. For example, the inspections by the 21 The form of the first-order condition in (16) is directly analogous to that in (10) for nonprofit enforcement and in (13) for for-profit enforcement. 22 The second derivative is
which is negative for Q(A) concave and α > η. 23 The proof is straightforward given the proofs of propositions 2 and 3 and hence is omitted. 24 That is,
FLA provide information about whether a member has abided by the FLA standards. Social label and certification organizations cannot expand the scope of self-regulation when the citizenry is homogeneous, so this section first introduces moral heterogeneity into the basic model. A heterogenous citizenry results in a second free-rider problem in which those with weaker moral preferences free ride on the actual contributions of those with stronger moral preferences.
A. unorganized Self-Regulation with a Heterogeneous Citizenry
Citizens can differ in the extent of their altruism, and this section introduces heterogeneity in the rates at which their limited altruism decreases with socioeconomic distance. Suppose that citizens are one of two types with moral preference parameters η i , i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ η 1 < η 2 , which are private, soft information that cannot be revealed to others. 25 Let β ∈ (0,1) denote the proportion of type 1s.
To introduce the second free-rider problem, consider unconditional altruism (θ = 1). The boundaries of self-regulation are
and the dominant strategy equilibrium with private information is qualitatively the same as the equilibrium in the case in which citizens are of one type. The same is true for any number of types. In the equilibrium characterized by (17) the type 2s free ride on the contributions of the type 1s. Because of unconditional altruism this free riding does not affect the behavior of the 1s, since their utility x e − η 1 y results only from their own contributions. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium and identifies the two free-rider problems. The first free-rider problem is that for matches y > y 1 o both types of citizen have an incentive to free ride. The second free-rider problem is that for matches y ∈ ( y 2 o , y 1 o ] the type 1s contribute and the type 2s free-ride on those contributions.
With reciprocal altruism actions are affected by the second free-rider problem. Let the type 1s play C with probability μ and the type 2s play C with probability ρ. Then, δ = βμ + (1 − β)ρ is the probability that a partner in a match plays C. Define the boundaries y i o (δ; θ), i = 1, 2, by
If y 2 o (0; θ) > 0, the dominant strategy for matches y ≤ y 2 o (0; θ) is for all citizens to play C. For y > y 2 o (1; θ) = y 2 o , a type 2 has a dominant strategy of playing N. For type 1s, playing C is a best response if y ∈ ( y 2 o ; y 1 o (0; θ)], which is nonempty if θx > c − b and
25 For example, a citizen cannot signal her type by moving first because the private provision of the local public good or private redistribution might not be observable.
There are three best-response equilibria for matches y ∈ (max { y 2 o , y 1 o (0; θ)}, y 1 o (β; θ)], where the interval is nonempty when
In one, all type 1s play C, and in another all type 1s play N. The third is a mixed strategy equilibrium analogous to the mixed strategy equilibrium for a homogeneous citizenry. 26 In one mixed strategy equilibrium, if the type 1s play C, the type 2s have a mixed strategy
which satisfies ρ( y 2 o (β; θ)) = 0 and ρ( y 2 o (1; θ)) = 1. The type 1s play C when the type 2s play ρ(y) for y ≤ y 2 o provided that y 1 o (β; θ) ≥ y 2 o . In this equilibrium, the type 1s play C on [ 0, y 2 o ]. There is also an equilibrium in which the type 1s play a mixed strategy μ( y) given by, for the case in which y 2 o < y 1 o (β; θ),
The probability μ( y) is increasing in y, so a greater likelihood of contributions by the partner is needed to induce contributions for more distant matches. o . There is then a unique equilibrium for each match distance y. For y ≤ y 2 o all citizens play C, and for y > y 2 o , all citizens play N. In this case the type 2s cannot free ride on the type 1s because the free riding for a match y > y 2 o would lead the type 1s not to contribute. In all three equilibria no type 1 contributes for y ∈ (max { y 2 o , y 1 o (β; θ)}, L ], since a type 1 citizen can count on a contribution only from the other type 1s with whom she might be matched.
Free riding by the type 2s thus limits the self-regulation by the type 1s when altruism is reciprocal, since a type 1 receives the utility x e − η y only when matched with another type 1. This occurs only with probability β, so for matches y ∈ (max { y 2 o , y 1 o (β; θ)}, y 1 o ] the best response is not to contribute. Consequently, when the citizenry is heterogeneous, the scope of selfregulation is smaller with reciprocal than with unilateral altruism. The scope of self-regulation is increasing in β, since then there are fewer type 2s to free ride and more type 1s to reciprocate. Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium with reciprocal altruism and a heterogeneous citizenry. The curve labeled η 1 is the expected reciprocated utility when only the type 1s contribute. As the figure illustrates, the second free-rider problem limits the scope of self-regulation; i.e., max { y 2 o , y 1 o (β; θ)} < y 1 o .
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The expected utility E u 1 o (β) for a type 1 in the Pareto dominant equilibrium with the greatest scope of self-regulation for the case in which (20) is satisfied is
The qualitative results of this section are robust to a change in the model in which the action of a citizen is observable by the other citizens and citizens have an opportunity to move first. Unless the type 1s are numerous, moving first mitigates, but does not eliminate, the second free-rider problem and has no effect on the first free-rider problem. A type 1 has an incentive to move first for matches y ∈ ( y 2 o , y i + (β; θ)], where y i + (β; θ) = L if c ≤ (1 + β)b and otherwise
If the type 1s are not numerous (β < (c − b)/b), the boundary y 1 + (β; θ) is strictly less than L, so neither free-rider problem is eliminated. If the type 1s are sufficiently numerous, both free-rider problems are eliminated.
where
) is the expected effect of the free riding by the type 2s on a type 1. The expected utility E u 2 o (β) for a type 2 for the case in which (20) is satisfied is
where the term βb( e
) is the expected gain to a type 2 from free riding on the type 1s.
B. Social Label Organizations
Social labeling allows citizens to interact with like citizens. Citizens cannot credibly reveal their types to others, but they can join a social label organization that attracts particular types of members. For example, in a green club as considered by Prakash and Potoski (2006) consumers can restrict their matches to retailers that meet green standards. Similarly, retailers can buy only from overseas suppliers that meet certain standards for working conditions in their factories, and suppliers meeting those standards can concentrate their sales on retailers that sell products produced under those standards.
The equilibria with a social label organization depend importantly on the nature of preferences. A social label organization cannot exist with unconditional altruism, whereas it can exist with reciprocal altruism. The social label organization is assumed to be open to all citizens, and the social label received, i.e., by joining the organization, is assumed to be publicly observable. Both types of citizen are assumed to be distributed uniformly on the circle, and assume that a match selects a distance y and places a citizen before citizens of both types. Citizens who are members of the organization can interact among themselves, and nonmembers interact with other citizens not in the organization. If only type 1s join the organization, they avoid the free riding by the type 2s, which then increases the scope of their self-regulation. The screening instrument is the membership fee g of the organization.
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To determine if a social label organization can attract type 1s but not type 2s, first consider unconditional (θ = 1) altruism. Citizens with stronger moral preferences ( η 1 ) can gain by joining an organization with only type 1s because contributions would be made for matches up to y 1 o . Their expected gain from such an organization is ΔE u 1 u = E u 1 * − E u 1 o , where the superscript u denotes unconditional altruism, Eu 1 * is given in (6) with η 1 replacing η and y 1 o replacing y o , and E u 1 o is given in (21) with θ = 1. This can be evaluated as
where the expected gain results from avoiding the loss (1 − β)b due to free riding by the type 2s. The social label organization can exist if there is a fee g ≤ ΔE u 1 u that no type 2 would be willing to pay. If a type 2 does not join the organization, he interacts only with other type 2s and his utility is given in (6) with η 2 and y 2 o replacing η and y o , respectively. If he joins the organization, he interacts only with type 1s and hence free rides with probability one for all matches y ∈ ( y 2 o , y 1 o ]. The gain ΔE u 2 u for a type 2 from joining the organization is then
which is greater than the gain to a type 1 citizen, so there is no fee that can separate the types.
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When altruism is unconditional, adverse selection precludes a social label organization that includes type 1s but not type 2s.
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With reciprocal altruism social labeling can take place, since the type 1s gain not only from the contribution provided by the other type 1s but also from the reciprocation of their altruism. The type 2s have no such gain, since they do not contribute for y > y 28 The organization can be thought of as formed by a social entrepreneur, who receives the membership fees and covers the cost of the organization. 29 A process by which this could take place is as follows. Any citizen can move first and join by paying g. The type 2s have no incentive to do so. If the types 1s joined and membership in the organization were observable, the type 2s would understand that those who joined were type 1s, and, hence, they would join. The type 1s then could not obtain the gain in (23) and recognizing this would not join. 30 An example of a failed social label organization is Responsible Care formed by firms in the chemical industry to improve safety and environmental performance in factories in the aftermath of the Bhopal tragedy. The firms joining Responsible Care included those with good and bad safety and environmental records, and the subsequent performance of the firms that joined was no better than the performance of firms that did not join (Andrew A. Michael J. Lenox 2000, 2002) . The performance of Responsible Care participants subsequently improved after enforcement mechanisms were put in place.
Their expected gain ΔE u 1 r , where superscript r denotes reciprocal, then is
The expected gain to a type 2 who joins the organization is given by (24).
If there exists a membership fee g satisfying = 0. Substituting this into the second integrand in (25) yields
For a given θ the term in (26) is nonnegative for β small. In the case of pure (θ = 0) reciprocal altruism this reduces to
o , the second integral in (25) can be negative, whereas the first integral is positive. When y 1 o (β; θ) is close to y 2 o , a membership fee exists satisfying (25), but as y 1 o (β; θ) approaches y 1 o , such a membership fee may not exist. This, however, requires that β or θ be high. Then, with pure reciprocal altruism and β high citizens contribute with high probability for matches y ∈ ( y 2 o , y 1 o ], so a social label organization can accomplish little. That is, the type 1s contribute on a sufficiently large set of matches in the absence of an organization that their willingness to pay for an organization is lower than any fee that would not attract type 2s.
The incentive for the type 1s to join a social label organization depends on the quality of selfregulation and the strength of moral preferences. The value created by the organization results from the additional contributions of the type 1s for matches y ∈ ( y 1 m (β; θ), y 1 o ]. This set can be THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW shown to be increasing in the quality of self-regulation and the strength of moral preferences.
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The incentive of the type 1s thus is not diminished by more attractive unorganized self-regulation. Reciprocal rather than unconditional altruism thus can give rise to a social label organization that enables type 1s to contribute for matches up to y 1 o , whereas with unorganized self-regulation they contribute only up to y 1 m (β; θ). A social label organization expands the scope of self-regulation, however, only by eliminating the effect of free-riding by those with weaker moral preferences on those with stronger moral preferences. That is, the organization mitigates the second free-rider problem but not the first. A social label organization thus allows citizens to expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond the scope with unconditional altruism. These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
C. Certification Organizations
Social labeling expands the scope of self-regulation by separating the types of citizens, which reduces the free riding by those with weaker moral preferences. In contrast, certification expands the scope of self-regulation by inducing citizens with weaker moral preferences to contribute for a larger set of matches so that in the next period they can free ride on citizens with stronger moral preferences. In addition, citizens with stronger moral preferences have an incentive to separate from those with weaker moral preferences for another set of matches, which also expands the scope of self-regulation. A certification organization thus can expand self-regulation, but the scope of self-regulation in the first period is bounded above by that with unconditional altruism.
This section considers a two-period extension of the model with a heterogeneous citizenry and reciprocal altruism and shows that a certification organization induces both pooling by citizens with weaker moral preferences and separation by citizens with stronger moral preferences. To affect the scope of self-regulation, information must be provided to future match partners about a citizen's play in the first period. The information system that accomplishes this is not modeled here, nor is the cost of that system. One simple type of information system is for a citizen in the first period match to give a certificate to her partner if and only if he contributed in a match of distance y. The certificate then can be shown to her matched partner in the second period. This system, however, has opportunities for fraud, e.g., counterfeiting the certificate, or corruption, e,g., paying the first-period partner to give a certificate when 31 To show this, consider the case in which y 1 m (β; θ) = y 2 o . Then,
and
where N is played. An information system, as in Dixit (2003a) , however, could resolve the issue of the credibility of the certificate. Alternatively, an independent NGO could monitor conduct and grant the certificate. Hence, a citizen who contributes in the first period will be assumed to receive a certificate from an organization that correctly identifies her action along with the socioeconomic distance of the match. In this setting type 2 citizens expand their self-regulation in the first period if they can free ride on the contributions of the type 1s in the second period. This requires that (20) be satisfied, which is assumed here, and in addition to simplify the exposition, (19) is assumed not to be satisfied. The analysis proceeds by conjecturing an equilibrium with in the first period pooling on an interval ( y 2 o , y 2 c ] and separation on an interval ( y 1 o (β; θ), y 1 c ] and then determining the set of matches such that no citizen prefers to deviate. The intuition is developed here, and the equilibrium is verified, and a proof of Proposition 8 below is presented in Appendix A.
For citizens who pool in the first period, their potential period-two partners have the same beliefs about their type at the beginning of period two as at the beginning of period one. The period-two equilibrium for a match between such citizens then is the same as the single-period equilibrium characterized in Section IVB, and the expected period-two utility for a type 2 is E u 2 o (β ) in (22). If a type 2 chooses N in the first period for matches in an interval ( y 2 o , y 2 c ], his type is revealed, and in the second period no partner will contribute for matches y > y 2 o , as shown in Appendix A. The expected period-two utility then is E u 2 o given in (6) with η 2 and y 2 o replacing η and y o , respectively. The utility difference ΔE u 2 for a type 2 citizen from playing C in period one versus playing N is then
where τ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor. The term b − c + x e − η 2 y in (27) is negative for y ∈ ( y 2 o , y 1 o ], so to free ride in period two the type 2 citizen must incur a loss in period one. The gain E u 2 o (β) − E u 2 o from free riding in the second period is positive and independent of the match distance in the first period, whereas the first period loss is increasing in y. Consequently, a type 2 has an incentive to contribute in period one for some y close to y 2 o . The strongest incentive for a type 2 to play N in the first period is for y = y 2 c , which has the largest period-one loss. For that match the type 2 will not deviate if
o , and substituting this into (28) yields c is strictly increasing in τ, so the more important is the gain from free riding in the second period the larger is the first-period pooling interval. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW As shown in Appendix A the type 1s gain in period two from having their type revealed in period one for some matches y > y 1 o (β; θ) for which they contribute and the type 2s do not contribute. This gain results because a revealed type 1 could be matched with a revealed type 1 in period two, in which case they both contribute for y ∈ [0, y 1 o ]. Type 1s thus have an incentive to separate from the type 2s for an additional set of matches y ∈ ( y 1 o (β; θ), _ y 1 c (β; θ)], where _ y 1 c (β; θ) is defined and characterized in Appendix A. Certification thus expands the scope of self-regulation for both types, 1 and 2, in period one. A certification organization, however, cannot expand the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism. That is, like social labeling certification mitigates the second but not the first free-rider problem.
The results for a certification organization are summarized in the following proposition, which is proven in Appendix A. With reciprocal altruism a certification organization increases the scope of self-regulation in the first period by the type 2s because they are in a dilemma. If they do not contribute for matches y ∈ ( y 2 o , _ y 2 c ], they reveal their type and with positive probability will not be able to free ride on their partner in the second period for any match y ∈ [ y 2 o , y 1 o (β; θ)]. So the threat of being excluded by the type 1s in the second period induces the 2s to pool with the 1s on a larger set of matches. This requires that there be an opportunity for free riding in period two, which requires that there are sufficient type 1s for (20) to be satisfied. Similarly, the type 1s expand their scope of self-regulation in the first period by separating from the 2s for an additional set of matches y ∈ ( y 1 o (β; θ), _ y 1 c (β; θ)]. This allows them to expand their self-regulation in the second period when matched with a type 1 whose type was revealed by a certificate. In contrast, with unconditional altruism citizens have dominant strategies, so the type 1s have no incentive to separate, and the type 2s have no incentive to pool, since they can free ride in the second period without a certificate. A certification organization thus cannot exist with unconditional altruism.
In period two, when ( 
A certification organization thus expands the scope of self-regulation in both periods if
. BARON: MORALLy MOTIVATEd SELf-REGuLATION This condition is satisfied, for example, if η 2 is close to η 1 , in which case the right side is close to 0.
VI. Conclusions
Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution and can result from a variety of motivations, including self-interest, forestalling public or private politics, and moral concerns. Two forms of moral preferences that seem natural are limited morality and reciprocal altruism. Limited morality can overcome the incentive to free ride for interactions among citizens who are close on some dimension but not for those who are distant. With reciprocal altruism and a heterogeneous citizenry a second free-rider problem can further limit self-regulation.
Informational organizations help citizens mitigate the second free-rider problem, whereas assurance organizations mitigate the first free-rider problem. Social label and certification organizations are limited in the sense that they deal only with the second free-rider problem, whereas enforcement organizations and social pressure deal with the first free-rider problem.
A social label organization allows those with similar preferences to interact among themselves, so citizens with stronger moral preferences can avoid the second free-rider problem, which then elicits expanded self-regulation. A certification organization expands self-regulation by inducing pooling for some matches by those citizens with weaker moral preferences and for more distant matches by inducing separation by those with stronger moral preferences. Pooling results because the opportunity to free ride in the second period outweighs the loss from contributing in the first period, which with limited altruism is small for some matches. Citizens with stronger moral preferences have an incentive to separate from those with weaker moral preferences by self-regulating for more distant matches so that they can increase the mutually beneficial self-regulation in the second period. Neither social label nor certification organizations address the first free-rider problem, so they cannot expand the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism.
Self-imposed enforcement expands the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism by addressing the first free-rider problem. Enforcement can be provided by both nonprofit and for-profit organizations. A profit-maximizing firm provides stronger enforcement than does a nonprofit organization, but it charges a price higher than the fee required by the nonprofit organization. Nonprofit enforcement is better for those citizens than for-profit enforcement unless the stronger enforcement sufficiently expands the scope of self-regulation. In that case for-profit enforcement can coexist with nonprofit enforcement.
An alternative to a private organization is to rely on social pressure by activist NGOs funded by voluntary donations by citizens. Naming and shaming can harm citizens by publicly disclosing their failure to self-regulate. Citizens face a collective action problem in their donation decisions, but reciprocal altruism is sufficient to overcome this problem. Social pressure increases the scope of self-regulation by mitigating the first free-rider problem, but unless the detection probability is high, the first free-rider problem is not eliminated. A(i) follows from substituting (12) into (13). Differentiating  p (h) in (12) and using A(i) yields A(ii). A(iii) is implied by (13) and individual rationality. A(iv) is implied by (13) given A(iii). A(v) follows from differentiating (12) with  h fixed by f ′ (  h ) = 1. A(vi) is shown by differentiating  y and using A(v). A(vii) results because (12) is independent of x and independent of θ when δ = 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The derivative dE u n /dh in (10) evaluated at h =  h is negative which, given the strict concavity of E u n at h * , implies that h * <  h . Then, since f (h) is strictly increasing, f ( h * ) < f (  h ), and b > h * is implied by (10). Property (iii) then follows directly from  y (1; θ) < L. That h * is independent of x and θ follows directly from (10), which is independent of x and of θ when δ = 1. Property (vi) follows directly from differentiating (10) and simplifying.
Parts B(i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 have been established above, and (iii) is immediate from (13) and B(ii). , and with probability βz she is in equilibria in which she and her partner contribute for y ∈[0, y 1 o ]. With probability (1 − β)z she is in equilibria in which she and her type 2 partner contribute for y ∈ [ 0, y 2 o ], where
PERIOD-TWO
is the probability that a type 1 citizen receives a certificate for first-period matches y ∈ ( y 1 o (β; θ),
The period-two expected utility E u 1 c (β) of a revealed type 1 is thus )/(1− e − αL )) from free riding on the type 1s in period two and loses c−b− x − η 2 y in the first period. As argued in the context of (29), for some y > y 2 o the loss in period one is exceeded by the gain in period 2, so a type 2 will play C.
(D) With unconditional altruism a citizen has a dominant strategy in both periods, and the argument presented in Section IVC shows that a certification organization cannot expand self-regulation.
where x M = (M − 1)x. This is the same as (3) (with δ = 1) with x M replacing x. If a citizen cares about others relative to their distance from her, the concept of a match distance is irrelevant. The expected utility of a citizen if she contributes is then
This is decreasing in η, increasing in b and x, and decreasing in c, as are the scope of self-regulation in (4) and the expected utility in (6).
Appendix C: Public Regulation
The public regulation considered here does not involve the public provision of the local public good or redistribution but instead requires citizens to contribute in the self-regulation game. Regulation thus does not affect the private cost c of contributing. 32 In addition, the availability of regulation is assumed not to affect the altruism of citizens.
Regulation could take a variety of forms. For example, it could be a uniform requirement of all citizens, or it could be selective. The first-best is to contribute for matches such that 2b − c + x e − αη ≥ 0, so the boundary y f b on contributions is
If c ≤ 2b, uniform regulation requires contributions by all citizens. If c > 2b, the regulator would have to observe the distance for each match to implement the first-best, which could be prohibitively costly. Moreover, uniform regulation could be wasteful in that some citizens would self-regulate, and to the extent that regulatory costs are increasing in the coverage of regulation, regulating all matches could be unwarranted. To give regulation its best chance against private, voluntary organizations, regulation on demand is considered where citizens choose to avail themselves of the regulatory powers based on their match distance. Also, to give public regulation its best chance, assume that all citizens comply with the regulation. Regulation on demand with citizens complying with that regulation also allows for a comparison with private enforcement organizations. Regulation is costly, so let t denote the cost per citizen of regulation on demand. Citizens in a match then demand regulation when (C1) 2b − c + x e − η y − t > 0, where the right side reflects citizens abiding by the law. For y > y o , the term b − c + x − η y < 0, so regulation will be demanded only if b > t. Thus, if t < b, the demand for regulation is for matches y ∈ ( y o , y t ], where
